SELF-DETERMINATION FOR SOME: THE PALESTINIANS
AND THE UYGHURS IN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY

BRIAN YEH*

Self-determination is attractive so long as it has not been attained;
alternatively, it is attractive so long as it is applied to others. Once realized,
enthusiasm dies fast, since henceforth, it can only be used to undermine
perceived internal and external stability.
-Antonio Cassese1
ABSTRACT
China’s first ever white paper publicly outlining its policy
toward the greater Middle East affirmed Beijing’s support for the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as well as an independent
Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as
its capital. Beijing’s support for Palestinian independence stands in
stark contrast and apparent tension with its oppression of its
Uyghur minority, who, like the Palestinians, aspire to an
independent state of their own in present-day Xinjiang. What
explains China’s continued support for an independent, Muslimmajority Palestinian state despite its brutal crackdown of its own
Muslim minority at home? Drawing on the literature on sovereignty
and self-determination, I argue that these policy positions are not
* J.D., 2019, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., 2014, Ohio State
University. I would like to thank Professor Jacques deLisle for his invaluable
feedback and advice in developing the idea for this comment. A special thank you
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inconsistent, and can indeed by reconciled. As a doctrinal matter,
international law has differentiated between permissible selfdetermination claims in the context of decolonization on the one
hand, and impermissible secessionist claims on the other. In its
foreign relations, China has consistently highlighted this distinction
and characterized Xinjiang as an integral part of Chinese territory,
with the necessary implication that Uyghur self-determination
claims are irredentist in nature. Whatever the legalities, in practice,
China has managed to reconcile these policies due in no small part
to its significant economic and political leverage and its framing of
its Uyghur policy as a security issue immune from criticism. By
maintaining this careful balancing act, China has facilitated—or at
least eliminated one possible roadblock to—the creation of a greater
role for itself in the Middle East, while not abandoning its historical
support for the Palestinians or emboldening secessionist
movements at home.
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INTRODUCTION

In its first ever white paper publicly laying out China’s policy
toward the greater Middle East, the Chinese government devoted
just two lines to the subject of Palestine, affirming its support for
“the Middle East peace process and the establishment of an
independent state of Palestine with full sovereignty, based on the
pre-1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.”2 China, the
paper continued, “supports the Arab League and its member states’
efforts to this end.”3 Belying the white paper’s cursory treatment of
the country’s Palestine policy, China has for several decades
staunchly advocated for the cause of Palestinian selfdetermination—a position borne out of a rich tradition of anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggle. In the mid-1960s, for
example, China provided significant material and moral support to
various Palestinian guerrilla factions4 and became the first non-Arab
country to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as an
independent entity. 5 More recently, China supported Palestine’s
successful bid to acquire “non-member observer state” status at the
United Nations in 2012,6 and in July of 2017, announced a four-point
Middle East peace plan reaffirming support for an independent
Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.7
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arab
Policy Paper (Jan. 13, 2016),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1331683.shtml
[https://perma.cc/LW7L-CMPK].
3 Id.
4
Lillian Craig Harris, China’s Relations with the PLO, 7 J. PALESTINE STUDIES 123,
123 (1977) (stating the close relations between the People’s Republic of China and
the Palestinian guerrilla organization).
5
John K. Cooley, China and the Palestinians, 1 J. PALESTINE STUDIES 19, 25 (1972)
(demonstrating that “Rashid Jarbou was appointed first PLO envoy in Peking, with
what amounted to diplomatic status. China thus became the first non-Arab country
in the world to recognize the PLO as an independent entity.”).
6
See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Votes
Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in
United Nations, U.N. Press Release GA/11317 (Nov. 29, 2012),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11317.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/729UKABC] (noting Chinese ambassador Baodong Li’s remark that the resolution
represented “another positive step in Palestine’s progress toward statehood.”).
7
Press Release, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the
U.N., Statement by Ambassador Liu Jieyi at the Security Council Open Debate on
the
Middle
East
(July
25,
2017),
http://www.chinaun.org/eng/hyyfy/t1481733.htm [https://perma.cc/K79A-PHYH].
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China’s support for Palestinian self-determination, though
fitting comfortably into its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist foreign
policy tradition, stands in stark contrast to—and in apparent tension
with—its oppressive treatment of its Uyghur minority, a Turkic
Muslim people who live in China’s northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region. Although the Uyghurs and the Palestinians
are separated in many respects by geography, language, culture,
and identity, the similarities between the two peoples and their
circumstances have led some observers to decry the
“Palestinization” of Xinjiang, a term coined by Chinese dissident
Lixiong Wang to describe the “full mobilization of a people and the
full extent of its hatred” toward the State.8 Indeed, apart from being
predominantly Muslim, both the Palestinians and the Uyghurs view
themselves as being victims of occupation and oppression—
Palestinians by the Israelis, the Uyghurs at the hands of the Han
Chinese majority.9 Like the Palestinians, the Uyghurs also aspire to
an independent state of their own, one in present-day Xinjiang
called East Turkestan. Moreover, many Uyghurs have expressed
sympathy for and found common cause with the Palestinians,
whom they view as enduring a plight similar to theirs.10
In contrast to Chinese support for Palestinian selfdetermination, however, China’s policy towards the Uyghurs has
been characterized by a lack of even modest self-determination or
self-governance, despite what Xinjiang’s official name might imply.
Over the past decade, Beijing’s control over this region has come
under growing international scrutiny as bouts of ethnic violence
between Uyghurs and Han Chinese have been met with a
disproportionate security crackdown by the central government. In
2009, for example, Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi was rocked by deadly
8
Wang Lixion, Excerpts from “My West China, Your East Turkestan” — My View
EXCHANGE
(Mar.
3,
2014),
on
the
Kunming
Incident,
CHINA
https://chinachange.org/2014/03/03/excerpts-from-my-west-china-your-eastturkestan-my-view-on-the-kunming-incident/ [https://perma.cc/FHG4-7ENM];
see also Michael Clarke, China and the Uyghurs: The “Palestinization” of Xinjiang?,
EAST
POLICY
COUNCIL,
https://mepc.org/china-and-uyghursMIDDLE
palestinization-xinjiang [https://perma.cc/FD9M-WZRZ] (suggesting in 2011 that
“[w]hile the situation in Xinjiang has not reached this point . . . the beginnings of
the Palestinization of the region are discernable at three levels.”).
9 See DANIEL JAMES SCHUSTER, RESISTING UNDER OCCUPATION: A PALESTINIANUYGHUR COMPARISON 10-12 (2017) (describing the similarities between the Uyghurs
and the Palestinians).
10
See Joanne Smith Finley, Chinese Oppression in Xinjiang, Middle Eastern
Conflicts and Global Islamic Solidarities Among the Uyghurs, 16 J. CONTEMPORARY
CHINA 627, 652 (2007).
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rioting that left more than 100 people dead,11 and at least twentynine people were killed by Uyghur assailants during a mass
stabbing attack at a train station in Kunming in 2014.12 In the period
between these attacks, China responded by investing millions of
dollars in security infrastructure and personnel to create a “multitiered security state” within Xinjiang to prevent further attacks. 13
Most recently, Beijing has drawn intense international
condemnation after reports emerged that it has forced more than
one million Uyghurs and other minorities into mass detention
camps that Beijing describes as “job-training centers,” but which a
growing body of evidence suggests are a network of forced labor
camps intended to erase the cultural and religious identity of the
Uyghurs and induce them to swear fealty to the Chinese Communist
Party.14 While this and other security crackdowns conducted under
the banner of the Strike Hard Campaign have been justified as a
prudent response to the problem of international terrorism in the
aftermath of September 11th, 15 they represent a part of a broader
11
Chris Buckley, Xinjiang Riot Toll Hits 156 as Unrest Spreads, REUTERS (July 6,
2009),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiangidUSTRE5650SW20090706 [https://perma.cc/58ZM-F5JE].
12
Andrew Jacobs, Train Station Rampage Further Strains Ethnic Relations in
China, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/world/asia/han-uighur-relationschina.html [https://perma.cc/72ZS-5D5D].
13
Adrian Zenz & James Leibold, Xinjiang’s Rapidly Evolving Security State, 15
CHINA BRIEF 4 (Mar. 14, 2017); Andrew Jacobs, Train Station Rampage Further
Strains Ethnic Relations in China, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/world/asia/han-uighur-relationschina.html [https://perma.cc/QRK6-L4X4].
14
See, e.g., Chris Buckley & Austin Ramzy, China’s Detention Camps for
Muslims
Turn
to
Forced
Labor,
N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
16,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/asia/xinjiang-china-forcedlabor-camps-uighurs.html [https://perma.cc/HQ37-Q79K]; Austin Ramzy &
Chris Buckley, ‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass
Detentions
of
Muslims,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
16,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiangdocuments.html [https://perma.cc/U4U6-D4M8].
15
James Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, EASTCENTER,
11
(2004),
WEST
https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/PS006.pdf?file=1&type=n
ode&id=32006 [https://perma.cc/47V8-QT35] (“Following the September 11 al
Qaeda attacks on the United States, official PRC pronouncements began to stress
the threat of ‘terrorism’ in Xinjiang as China’s leadership maneuvered to position
itself ‘side by side with the United States in the war against terror.’ This apparently
required a revision of the official description of separatists in Xinjiang. What had
generally been described as a handful of separatists was now a full-blown ‘terrorist
organization.’”)
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effort by Beijing to suppress the identity and national aspirations of
the Uyghur people through a variety of social, political, and
economic means.16 As indicated in a 2002 document released by the
Information Office of the State Council entitled “‘East Turkistan’
Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity,” these efforts
stem from Beijing’s fear of attempts by Uyghur separatists—known
as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement17—to form an independent
state called East Turkestan within the borders of present-day
Xinjiang.18
With such actual and perceived threats to its rule in Xinjiang,
what explains China’s continued support for an independent,
Muslim-majority Palestinian state? Can its efforts to squelch ethnic
separatism in Xinjiang be reconciled with a policy of support for
Palestinian self-determination? Drawing on the literature on
sovereignty and self-determination, I argue that these two policy
positions are not inconsistent. Doctrinally, and as a matter of
international law, self-determination that results in independence is
much more robust and widely accepted in the context of
decolonization than secession. In practice, the Chinese government
has carefully hewed to this distinction in its foreign relations,
voicing support for the right of non-self-governing peoples to selfdetermination, while at the same time condemning separatist
movements and characterizing Xinjiang (like Taiwan and Tibet) as
indisputably Chinese territory.
Whatever the legalities, the politics of foreign policy are such
that in the modern era, China has managed to comfortably voice
weak rhetorical support for the Palestinians while effectively
16
See, e.g., Staff of the Global Legal Research Center of the Law Library of
Congress, Report for U.S. Department of Justice, Treatment of the Uyghur Ethnic
Group
in
the
Peoples
Republic
of
China,
5–8
(Mar.
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/
30/loc_03-2015_china.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL5K-A2GA] (discussing restrictions
on Uyghurs’ religious practices, language, and cultural identity); Human Rights
Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang (Apr. 11, 2005),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/04/11/devastating-blows/religiousrepression-uighurs-xinjiang [https://perma.cc/ZA4X-HJME].
17
Beina Xu, Holly Fletcher & Jayshree Bajoria, The East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 4, 2014),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim
[https://perma.cc/T7D2-2FJR].
18
CHINA INTERNET INFORMATION CENTER, ”East Turkistan” Terrorist Forces
Cannot
Get
Away
With
Impunity,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Jan/25582.htm
[https://perma.cc/GFN7-65VY].

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

1144

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:4

muffling any criticisms of its policy toward its Uyghur minority at
home. Indeed, China has managed to successfully frame the
Uyghur issue as a security issue in its relations with its regional
neighbors, an effort aided in no small part by its significant
economic and political leverage. Indeed, even countries most
sympathetic to the plight of the Uyghurs, such as Turkey, have
increasingly shied away from taking any meaningful steps to hold
China accountable for its oppression of the Uyghurs.
By
maintaining this careful balancing act, China has managed to stake
a position that simultaneously facilitate a greater role for itself in the
Middle East, while not abandoning its historical support for a
revolutionary ally or emboldening secessionist sentiments at home.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Part 2, I discuss the legal and
political norm of self-determination and its relation to the law of
statehood in the international system. I show that the distinction the
international community has drawn between self-determination in
the decolonization context and secession has been embraced by the
Chinese government in its foreign relations. In Part 3, I provide an
overview of China’s relationship with Palestine, focusing both on
the historical origins of the relationship and its contemporary
manifestations. Part 4 discusses China’s control over Xinjiang, with
an analysis of the implications of China’s policies vis-à-vis the
Uyghurs on its foreign relations. In Part 5, I discuss why Chinese
support for Palestinian self-determination and its policies toward
the Uyghurs are not incompatible, as well as the extent to which
China itself has attempted to reconcile these positions. In particular,
I argue that it is unlikely that China rhetorically supports Palestinian
independence as a means of asserting influence in the Middle East;
that support predates China’s interest in expanding its footprint in
the region and has faded, and Beijing has, moreover, cultivated
closer political and military ties with Israel in recent years while
supporting the broader “peace process” led by the international
community.
2.

SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
CHINESE POSITION

Most commonly associated with President Woodrow Wilson’s
Fourteen Points, the notion of self-determination can be traced to
geopolitical developments that swept through eighteenth and
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nineteenth century Europe19—and perhaps even earlier still.20 Selfdetermination is generally understood to be “[t]he proposition . . .
that every people should freely determine its own political status
and freely pursue its economic, social, and cultural development.”21
It can be exercised in the form of secession, association in a
federation, or autonomy or assimilation in a unitary state.22 As it
was first conceptualized, however, self-determination was
understood to inure to the benefit only of states, as it was first
manifested in the European contests for power that led to the
creation of new nation-states in the aftermath of the disintegration
of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.23 Since that time,
neither the status nor the content of self-determination have been
identified with precision, 24 and today there exists no universally
agreed-upon definition of what self-determination means.25
As to status, Professor Brownlie notes that self-determination
has been referred to variously as a political principle, a legal
principle, and a legal right.26 Self-determination was first enshrined
as a “principle” in 1945 in Article 1(2) of the Charter of the United
Nations, which did not, however, define its meaning.27 Although
19

(1996).

HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY

AND

SELF-DETERMINATION 27

20
See CASSESE, supra note 1, at 14-23 (arguing that the precursor to selfdetermination was the refrain heard during the French and American revolutions
that sovereignty belonged to the people). See also KRISTINA ROEPSTORFF, THE
POLITICS OF SELF-DETERMINATION: BEYOND THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS 10-11
(2013).
21
John P. Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 193 (Theodore Meron ed., 1984). See
also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 647 (8th
ed. 2012) (defining self-determination as a general matter as “the right of a
community which has a distinct character to have this character reflected in the
institutions under which it lives”).
22
CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 141.
23 See HANNUM, supra note 19, at 27-28.
24 See LORI FISLER DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 309 (6th ed. 2009) (“Notwithstanding its treatment in legal
documents and decisions, the concept of self-determination remains fraught with
uncertainty . . .”); HANNUM, supra note 19, at 27 (“[T]he meaning and content of that
right remain as vague and imprecise as when they were enunciated by President
Woodrow Wilson and others at Versailles.”).
25
CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 646.
26
Id.
27
DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at 307. It was also recognized as a
principle in non-treaty instruments such as the UN Declaration of Friendly
Relations. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
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that principle was mentioned only twice in the U.N. Charter and not
at all in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,28 selfdetermination thereafter “evolved” into a right when the U.N.
Declaration on Colonial Countries declared that “[a]ll peoples have
the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.”29 It was subsequently recognized
as a right in treaty instruments such as the International Covenant
on Social and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well.30 Despite this wide
recognition of a “right” to self-determination, a series of decisions
rendered by the International Court of Justice has left selfdetermination’s status as a right under international law somewhat
in doubt. As Professor Jan Klabbers notes, while the ICJ in the South
West Africa case “displayed a conception of self-determination as a
substantive right that accrues to peoples,”31 it consciously avoided
using the term “right” in its Western Sahara opinion four years
later—opting instead to refer to the “principle” of selfdetermination. 32 Adding to this uncertainty, there exists some
scholarly disagreement as to whether the principle of selfdetermination is a rule of customary international law, jus cogens, or
not a rule of law at all.33
Regardless of the status accorded to self-determination under
international law, it is apparent that as a general principle, selfdetermination “will continue to be a major political force both
internationally and domestically.” 34 In the post-Cold War era,
however, the locus of the debate has centered on the scope of selfdetermination itself 35 : to whom it applies, what practical
consequences its realization should entail, the circumstances under
which self-determination may be exercised, and how it is to be

HANNUM, supra note 19, at 33.
G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
30
DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at 308.
31
Jan Klabbers, The Right to be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in
International Law, 28 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 186, 191 (2006).
32 Id. at 195-96.
33
HANNUM, supra note 19, at 44-45.
34 Id. at 49.
35
ROEPSTORFF, supra note 20, at 31.
28
29
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reconciled with conflicting principles of international law.36 As a
practical matter, it is well established that peoples living under
colonial rule 37 and foreign occupation 38 have the right to selfdetermination. Indeed, self-determination’s emergence as a more
precise, substantive principle under international law took place
with the articulation of the so-called “salt-water theory of
decolonization,” which required as a condition precedent to selfdetermination a people living “in a distinct overseas territory with
an ocean separating them from the respective colonial power.” 39
This theory of self-determination came to guide United Nations
practice during the decolonization period. 40 In this context,
international law recognizes the right of colonized people to
independence.41
Although a “pronounced distinction” has developed between
self-determination in the colonial and non-colonial contexts, 42 the
increase in the number of self-determination claims outside of the
colonial context in the post-Cold War era—such as the dissolution
of the Soviet Union and separatist movements in the Caucasus and
Africa—has posed a challenge to the viability of this paradigm43 and
highlighted a parallel distinction between external and internal selfdetermination.44 That distinction arose, in part, to limit secession to
a very limited set of circumstances. 45 In its famous Reference re:
36 See DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at 309 (citing EDWARD MCWHINNEY,
THE UNITED NATIONS AND A NEW WORLD ORDER FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM: SELFDETERMINATION, STATE SUCCESSION, AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (2000); JAMES
R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-48 (2d ed. 2006)).
37
CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 646.
38 See id. (noting that self-determination “has been understood as the right of
peoples under colonial, foreign, or alien domination to self-government”); CASSESE,
supra note 1, at 90 (observing that “[s]tate practice and United Nations resolutions
make it clear that external self-determination is a right belonging not only to
colonial peoples but also to peoples subject to foreign occupation.”).
39
ROEPSTORFF, supra note 20, at 15.
40
See DAVID RAIC, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 207
(2002).
41
CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 14.
42 Id. at 647; see also HANNUM, supra note 19, at 46 (noting that the right to selfdetermination has been sharply limited to the colonial context and that no state has
ever recognized the right of self-determination of all peoples).
43
ROEPSTORFF, supra note 20, at 31; see also DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note
24, at 309.
44
CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 141.
45
MILENA STERIO, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW: “SELFISTANS,” SECESSION, AND THE RULE OF THE GREAT POWERS 22 (2013).
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Secession of Quebec decision, the Canadian Supreme Court
expounded upon the difference between internal and external selfdetermination, describing the former as “a people’s pursuit of its
political, economic, social and cultural development within the
framework of an existing state”46 and the latter as a right that “arises
in only the most extreme cases and, even then, under carefully
defined circumstances.”47 As with other aspects of the law on selfdetermination, the notions of internal self-determination and
secession continue to arouse controversy.48 This is especially true
for the concept of remedial secession, which holds that a people that
is subjected to gross and systematic human rights abuses can break
away from a state that is committing those abuses against it.49
Additionally, contemporary claims of self-determination are
problematic in the legal sense in at least two respects. As an initial
matter, the international instruments speaking to the right of selfdetermination of “peoples” do not establish whether the right to
self-determination in general may be exercised outside the context
of decolonization.50 Moreover, external self-determination claims,
such as those espoused by separatist movements, lie in obvious
tension with the principle of territorial integrity enshrined in Article
2(4) of the UN Charter, as well as the principle of uti possidetis, which
prioritizes the stability of international boundaries.51 As Professor
Milena Sterio writes, these two norms interact such that “an act of
external self-determination, resulting in secession, not covered by
the right to colonial self-determination is typically (yet not always)
considered unlawful in international law.” 52 In a state-centric
system that prioritizes order and stability and in which acquiring
defined and fixed territory is a prerequisite to participation in such
a system, 53 it is not altogether unsurprising that limits to the
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
Id.
48
CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 142.
49
Jure Vidmar, Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of)
Practice, 6 ST. ANTHONY’S INT’L REV. 37, 38 (2010).
50
DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at 309; see also Milena Sterio, SelfDetermination and Secession Under International Law: The New Framework, 21 ILSA J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 293, 293 (2015) (“[I]nternational law is silent on the issue of
whether a non-colonized minority group ever accrues the positive right to
remedially.”).
51
STERIO, supra note 45, at 21.
52
Id.
53
Joshua Castellino, Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to Self-Determination:
An Examination of the Conceptual Tools, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 503, 506-08 (2008).
46
47
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assertion of self-determination claims outside of the colonial context
have developed—particularly with respect to those claims that
could result in the fracturing of international borders.
Notwithstanding the uncertainties surrounding the status and
scope of self-determination under international law, the People’s
Republic of China—in both its statements and in practice—has
adhered to a clear distinction between what it perceives as legitimate
claims to self-determination in the decolonization context on the one
hand, and illegitimate secessionist claims on the other. For example,
in a written statement submitted to the International Court of Justice
in the question of the Accordance with International Law of the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government of Kosovo, China declared:
Although the principle of self-determination has become a
basic principle of international law, it applies within specific
limits, primarily restricted to situations of colonial rule or
foreign occupation . . . The right of self-determination is
different in nature from the so-called right of secession. The
exercise of the right of self-determination shall not
undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
State concerned.54
Similarly, in a 2004 statement before the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights concerning the situation in Israel and Palestine, a
Chinese envoy expressed China’s unequivocal support for the
struggle for self-determination and independence of colonized
peoples while explicitly distinguishing attempts to secede from
sovereign states:
The right of peoples to self-determination, which was
historically important, was a powerful weapon for the
oppressed nations to fight against imperialism and
colonialism so as to win their national independence and the
liberation of their peoples, is still of great relevance today. In
the contemporary world, the right to self-determination is a
sacred principle. It means that each people can choose its
own political and social system as well as its own economic
54
Written Statement of the People's Republic of China to the International
Court of Justice on the Issue of Kosovo, in letter dated Apr. 16 2009 from the Amb.
of the People’s Republic of China to the Kingdom of the Netherlands addressed to
the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, https://www.icjcij.org/files/case-related/141/15611.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MXA-VRBY]
(hereinafter Kosovo Statement).
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model and path to development, oppose foreign aggression,
interference and control, and safeguard sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity.
...
At the same time, we should be aware that there are some
people, who, with their evil intention, openly advocate the
splitting of sovereign states under the cloak of selfdetermination. Such practice also tramples upon the U.N.
Charter and the fundamental principles of international law
and deserves the condemnation and firm opposition from all
peoples of the world.55
In part, the distinction that China has drawn between legitimate
claims of self-determination and illegitimate secessionist claims can
be traced to its strong anti-colonial foreign policy and support for
developing countries. During the 1960s and 1970s, facing what it
perceived as a “hostile” international strategic environment, China
provided both rhetorical and material support for various national
liberation movements in Africa in part to counter Soviet
“revisionism” and American imperialism, as well as to compete for
influence against the Nationalist government in Taiwan. 56 The
essence of China’s foreign policy during this period was captured in
Premier Zhou Enlai’s 1975 declaration that “[t]he Third World is the
main force in combating colonialism, imperialism, and
hegemonism. China is a developing socialist country belonging to
the Third World.” 57 Similarly, in 1963, Chinese Foreign Minister
Chen Yi stated: “China will support revolutions against imperialism
and oppression. This is not to say that we are behind all revolutions
. . . But China will support foreign revolutions both morally and
politically. We are Marxists.”58

55
Press Release, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the
U.N. Office at Geneva, Statement by Mr. Mei Yuncai, Advisor of the Chinese
Delegation on the Right to Self-Determination (Item5) at the 57th Session of the
Commission on Human Rights (Apr. 16, 2004), http://www.chinaun.ch/eng/dbtyw/rqrd_1/thsm/t85127.htm [https://perma.cc/S9MN-Y4FD].
56
Shen Ding, To Build a “Harmonious World”: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the
Global South, 13 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 193, 199 (2008); see also George T. Yu, China and
the Third World, 17 ASIAN SURV. 1036, 1037-42 (1977) (tracing the development of
China’s “Third World policy” in the 1970s to its efforts to combat U.S imperialism
and Soviet “social-imperialism.”).
57
Yu, supra note 56, at 1036.
58
Cooley, supra note 5, at 31.
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As Professor George Yu documents, beginning in the 1950s,
Africa came to occupy an important part of Chinese foreign policy,
with China concluding a variety of friendship, cultural, commercial,
and economic aid agreements with newly-independent African
countries in part by appealing to anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist
sentiment, as well as a sense of Asian-African unity.59 As part of its
African foreign policy, China took the position that only when all
African countries became free would the fight against colonialism
end, and advocated armed struggle as one means of achieving that
goal. 60 China’s overtures to Africa were not divorced from the
geopolitical reality taking place around it, however, and it
emphasized as well that colonialism would not end so long as the
forces of imperialism continued to present a threat.61 Additionally,
China emphasized Asian and African peoples’ common experience
with imperialist and colonial subjugation by Europeans and
Americans and the importance of mutual cooperation.62 It should
be noted, however, that China did not support all national liberation
movements, declining to do so where they might implicate its
national interests.63 For example, while exhibiting at least passing
support for the Eritrea Liberation Front, China simultaneously
sought closer relations with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.64
Similarly, China declined to support independence fighters in East
Pakistan, opting instead to support the military authorities in West
Pakistan.65
To this day, China continues to draw explicitly on its own
experiences with colonialism and imperialism in addressing selfdetermination, decolonization, and secessionist issues abroad. For
example, in a written statement submitted to the ICJ on the Legal
Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius
in 1965 (Request for Advisory Opinion), China stated:
Once a victim of aggression and oppression under
imperialism and colonialism, China sympathizes with the
peoples under colonial rule and knows full well their
59

(1965).
60
61
62
63
64
65

George T. Yu, Sino-African Relations: A Survey, 5 ASIAN SURV. 321, 322-27
Id. at 322.
Id.
Id. at 323.
Cooley, supra note 5, at 31.
Id.
Id.
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sufferings. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of
China solemnly states in its preamble that “China
consistently opposes imperialism, hegemonism and
colonialism, works to strengthen unity with the people of
other countries, supports the oppressed nations and the
developing countries in their just struggle to win and
preserve national independence and develop their national
economies, and strives to safeguard world peace and
promote the cause of human progress”. On the international
stage, China firmly supports the efforts made by the United
Nations to help colonial countries and peoples exercise their
right to self-determination and achieve independence, takes
an active part in the United Nations’ work of decolonization,
and gives strong support, both politically and economically,
to colonial countries and peoples, including African
countries.66
Consistent with this position, in the contemporary era China has
continued to support movements for independence from colonial
rule while vigorously condemning secessionist movements
elsewhere. For example, China played a role in East Timor’s first
bid for independence in the 1970s when it backed the Frente
Revolucionaria de Timore-Leste Independente Party’s (FRETILIN)
declaration of independence from Portugal. 67 When, after a
purported Indonesian annexation and a subsequent referendum,
East Timor became fully independent in 2002, China was also the
first country to establish formal diplomatic ties with the country.
Since 2005, it has been a major funder of construction and
infrastructure projects in the country in part to counterbalance U.S.
influence in the region and to lure the country away from support
for Taiwan. 68 When, on the other hand, Kosovo declared
independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008, a spokesperson for
66
Written Statement of the People’s Republic of China to the International
Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago
from Mauritius in 1965 (Request for Advisory Opinion), 8 (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/169/169-20180301-WRI-03-00-EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BM6A-HTAE].
67
Ian Storey, China and East Timor: Good, But Not Best Friends, JAMESTOWN (July
5, 2006), https://jamestown.org/program/china-and-east-timor-good-but-notbest-friends-3/ [https://perma.cc/6FTE-8DH2].
68
RHODA MARGESSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33994,
EAST TIMOR: POLITICAL DYNAMICS, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
20 (2009).
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the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed “grave concern” warning
that “[t]he unilateral move taken by Kosovo will lead to a series of
consequences.” 69 Later, in 2009, China submitted a written
statement to the ICJ backing Serbia and arguing that U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which called for Kosovo to “enjoy
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”
and which reaffirmed the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” furnished the only basis for
resolution of the Kosovo issue. 70 Moreover, it made its first oral
argument before the ICJ for the first time since the 1960s in support
of Serbia’s position.71 Notwithstanding China’s vocal support for
self-determination in the decolonization context and its opposition
to secession, China’s stances on these issues have not been
altogether entirely consistent. Indeed, as the cases of Hong Kong
and Crimea illustrate, its policy of supporting self-determination
claims (or not) does not adhere to rigid and inflexible rules but
rather is informed by China’s present strategic interests.
For example, almost three months after the People’s Republic of
China reassumed China’s seat at the United Nations, it successfully
lobbied for Hong Kong to be removed from the U.N. Decolonization
Committee’s list of colonial territories, arguing that Hong Kong (as
well as Macau) was a Chinese territory that Britain had colonized on
the basis of unequal treaties.72 The case of Crimea provides another
interesting counterpoint to China’s policy of distinguishing between
permissible self-determination claims and impermissible irredentist
movements. On March 16, 2014, in a referendum criticized by
Western observers as illegitimate, Crimea voted to secede from
Ukraine and become a part of Russia.73 The United States and the
European Union swiftly condemned the move, with President
69
Press Release, Chinese Foreign Ministry, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Liu Jianchao’s Remarks on Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Feb.
18,
2008),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/fyrth/t408032.htm
[https://perma.cc/MM6Z-KVAD].
70 Kosovo Statement, supra note 54, at 1-2.
71
Dan Bilefsky, World Court Rules Kosovo Declaration Was Legal, N.Y. TIMES
(July
22,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/world/europe/23kosovo.html
[https://perma.cc/6TSJ-WLAY].
72
Nihal Jayawickrama, Hong Kong: The Gathering Storm, 22 BULLETIN OF PEACE
PROPOSALS 157, 164 (1991).
73
David M. Herszenhorn, Crimea Votes to Secede from Ukraine as Russian Troops
TIMES
(Mar.
16,
2014),
Keep
Watch,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/europe/crimea-ukrainesecession-vote-referendum.html [https://perma.cc/66TP-777C].
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Obama telling Russian president Vladimir Putin in a phone call that
the results of the referendum “would never be recognized by the
United States and the international community.” 74 By contrast,
China’s reaction was much more equivocal. For example, it
abstained from a vote on a Security Council resolution condemning
the referendum as illegal, which was ultimately blocked by Russia.75
Later, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang issued a statement
on the Security Council vote, which reads, in part:
China always respects all countries’ sovereignty and
territorial integrity. It is a basic diplomatic principle that has
long been upheld by China. We believe that due to the
complex historical and practical factors, we should take
everything into consideration when dealing with the
Ukraine issue. China disapproves of confrontation. The U.N.
Security Council’s vote on the draft resolution will only lead
to confrontation among all parties, which will further
complicate the situation. It goes against the common
interests of the Ukrainian people and the international
community. Under the current circumstances, China calls on
all parties to keep calm, exercise restraint and refrain from
raising the tension. What is imperative now is to push for a
political settlement.76
Given China’s strong relations with Russia77—the two countries
regularly participate in joint military drills and growing trade and

74
Karen DeYoung, U.S. Warns Russia Against Annexing Crimea, WASH. POST
(Mar. 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/uswarns-russia-against-annexing-crimea/2014/03/16/2b4a7006-ad45-11e3-9627c65021d6d572_story.html?utm_term=.dd09151af072
[https://perma.cc/99T4JK7G].
75
Shannon Tiezzi, China Reacts to the Crimea Referendum, DIPLOMAT (Mar. 18,
2014),
https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-reacts-to-the-crimeareferendum/ [https://perma.cc/A4SG-FB53].
76
Press Release, Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in New
York, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on the U.N. Security
Council’s Vote on the Draft Resolution on the Referendum in Crimea (Mar. 16,
2014),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgny/eng/fyrth/t1137754.htm
[https://perma.cc/W78E-MMXD].
77
Robert Sutter, Foreword to MICHAEL S. CHASE ET AL., RUSSIA-CHINA
RELATIONS: ASSESSING COMMON GROUND AND STRATEGIC FAULT LINES, at v (2017)
(observing that “[c]ommon interests, opposition to U.S. pressure, and the perceived
decline of the West” have prompted closer Sino-Russian ties).
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investment links78—it was perhaps not altogether unsurprising that
China avoided condemning the secession referendum outright.
Nevertheless, its position stands in stark contrast to China’s
opposition to separatist movements that challenge the territorial
integrity of sovereign states. Some Western observers have
suggested that China’s position on Crimea was driven in part by its
concern about secessionist movements at home. For example, one
journalist wrote that, “the way China responds to Crimean
separatism highlights Beijing’s refusal to recognise similar demands
for political autonomy in its own backyard. If China respects
Crimean demands to dictate their own political future, why not
those in Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan?”79 Similarly, noting that Chinese
authorities had allegedly prohibited domestic media outlets from
linking Crimea to the country’s problems with Tibet, Xinjiang, and
Taiwan, another observer wrote that “it’s also dangerous for Beijing
to go on record as supporting the secession of a piece of territory
based on ethnic, cultural or linguistic differences.” 80 Similar
comments from Western observers and publications abound.81 By
contrast, Lihua Zhang, a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua
Center for Global Policy, traces China’s position on Crimea to three
underlying themes. First, she argues that China’s refusal to vote in
favor of the UN Security Council’s resolution was an implicit rebuke
at what it perceives as the United States and its European allies’

78 See Ethan Meick, China-Russia Military-to-Military-Relations: Moving Toward
a Higher Level of Cooperation, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW COMMISSION 6-11
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ChinaRussia%20MilMil%20Relations%20Moving%20Toward%20Higher%20Level%20of%20Cooperati
on.pdf [https://perma.cc/GF2F-DTAD]; Evan S. Medeiros & Michael S. Chase,
Chinese Perspectives on the Sino-Russian Relationship, in RUSSIA-CHINA RELATIONS:
ASSESSING COMMON GROUND AND STRATEGIC FAULT LINES 1, 9 (2017).
79
Celia Hatton, China’s Crimea Dilemma, BBC (Mar. 17, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-26610475
[https://perma.cc/8GUA-NFEZ].
80
Shannon Tiezzi, China Reacts to the Crimea Referendum, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar.
18,
2014),
https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-reacts-to-the-crimeareferendum/ [https://perma.cc/A4SG-FB53].
81 See, e.g., Geoff Dyer, In the Battle for Crimea, China Wins, FOREIGN POLICY
(Mar. 12, 2014), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/12/in-the-battle-for-crimeachina-wins/ [https://perma.cc/6K3J-ZBNB] (“China is also allergic to separatist
movements within countries. If Crimea can be allowed to vote for independence,
why not Tibet?”).
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attempts to broaden their influence in Eastern Europe.82 Second, she
argues that “[t]he Crimean referendum was an internal Ukrainian
issue” and that, guided by its Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, China did not wish to intervene in Ukraine’s internal
affairs.83 Finally, Zhang argues that Russia and Ukraine have long
had a complicated history and that it was understandable for Russia
to consider Ukraine “as a part of its sphere of influence and as a
defensive zone between itself and the EU.”84
As is evident from China’s sometimes inconsistent positions on
secessionist movements abroad, its decision to recognize or not
recognize the legitimacy of those movements and their claims rests
in no small part on broader strategic considerations and national
interests. As one scholar has noted, with respect to China’s
relationship with the Palestinians, “[t]he twin bases of China’s
action in the world outside are ideology and national interest. The
two are often interdependent, but sometimes they seem to clash.”85
The rest of this paper seeks to identify whether and to what extent
these ideological and national interests explain China’s continued
support for an independent Palestinian state in light of its
secessionist troubles at home, and whether that policy can be
reconciled within the established framework that China has
followed in distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate
claims of self-determination.
3.

CHINA AND THE PALESTINIANS: FROM REVOLUTIONARY
PARTNERS TO SYMBOLIC ALLIES

A full historical account of China’s relationship with the
Palestinians is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is
sufficient to note that China’s support for Palestine has been both
longstanding and driven by its historical experience of subjugation
at the hands of foreign powers, as well as broader strategic interests.
For example, in his first speech to the United Nations in 1971,
Chinese delegate Qiao Guanhua declared:
82
Lihua Zhang, Explaining China’s Position on the Crimea Referendum,
CTR.
FOR
GLOBAL
POLICY
(Apr.
1,
2015),
CARNEGIE-TSINGHUA
https://carnegietsinghua.org/2015/04/01/explaining-china-s-position-oncrimea-referendum-pub-59600 [https://perma.cc/7GRA-EUCE].
83 Id.
84 Id.
85
Cooley, supra note 5, at 32.
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The intrinsic nature of the Middle East question lies in the
aggression against the Palestinian people and the other Arab
peoples committed by Israeli Zionism, with the support and
connivance of the superpowers. The Chinese government
and people give their resolute support to the Palestinian
people and the other Arab peoples against aggression and
are convinced that, in persevering in their struggle and
maintaining unity, the heroic Palestinians and the other Arab
peoples will surely be able to recover their lost territories and
re-establish the Palestinian people in its national rights.
No one has the right to seek to conclude political deals
behind the backs of the Palestinians and other Arabs so as to
injure their right to existence and their other national
interests.86
Reflecting this interest in the Palestinian cause, a map published
in the Peking Review in 1968 lists Palestine as one of twelve
“revolutionary” zones of interest to China.87 As scholar John Cooley
notes, both China and Palestine were “invaded, attacked and
humiliated by foreigners. The result in both cases was a profound
case of culture shock.”88 In offering assistance to the Palestinians’
struggle against the Israelis, China thus characterized its assistance
as that of “revolutionary peoples” helping one another.89 Indeed,
China viewed Palestine as being in the national-democratic stage of
an eventual socialist revolution; China was eager to lend its
assistance in the hopes of demonstrating that its model of socialist
revolution was both realistic and attainable.90 China’s interest in the
Palestinians also may have been due to its desire to combat
imperialism in the region and to counter Soviet influence in the
region.91
Another reason for Chinese support of the Palestinians during
this period was China’s desire to use Palestine as a base to further

Id. at 19 (quoting Agence-France Presse (AFP), November 16, 1971).
Id. at 32.
88 Id. at 20.
89 Id.
90
Harris, supra note 4, at 125-26.
91 Id. at 127 (quoting Mao Zedong as saying, “Imperialism is afraid of China
and of the Arabs. Israel and Formosa are bases of imperialism in Asia. You are the
gate of the great continent and we are the rear. They created Israel for you, and
Formosa for us. Their goal is the same.”).
86
87
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project its influence throughout the Middle East.92 Despite having
established relations with Egypt and Syria by the mid-1950s, China’s
relationship with Arab countries slowly deteriorated in the early
1960s over various disputes with Arab leaders, such as Gamal Abdel
Nasser’s 1959 decision to back rebels in Tibet 93 and an increased
Soviet presence in Egypt and Syria.94 Despite this, or perhaps as a
consequence of these circumstances, China began to shore up its
support for the Palestinians and, at least rhetorically, attempted to
link Palestine with the broader interests of Arab countries. In 1964,
for example, Zhou Enlai declared, “We are ready to help the Arab
nations to regain Palestine. Whenever you are ready, say the word.
You will find us ready. We are willing to give you anything and
everything; arms and volunteers.” 95 Following this declaration,
China, among others things, announced that it would comply with
the decisions of the Arab Office for the Boycott of Israel and began
to support the Palestinian political faction Fatah.96 The creation of
the Palestine Liberation Organization allowed China to publicize its
support for the Palestinian cause,97 and, in 1965, China became the
first non-Arab country to recognize the PLO as an independent
entity.98
Beginning in 1965, China began providing significant material
and moral support for the Palestinians. That year, China agreed to
provide the Palestinians with diplomatic, economic, and military aid
in an agreement that would see that aid channeled through the PLO
as an umbrella organization to other Palestinian factions.99 Reports
also indicate that, prior to the 1967 War, China provided a steady
stream of arms and training to Palestinian forces through various
ports in the region. 100 Verbally, China expressed support for the
Arab governments in the days before the Israeli offensive, and even
after the Arab countries were defeated, Zhou Enlai urged Ahmad
Id. at 126.
Cooley, supra note 5, at 23.
94 Id. at 24.
95
Id. (quoting Information Bulletin, Embassy of the People’s Republic of
China (Cairo), December 24, 1964).
96 Id.
97
Id. (“These preparations and the creation of the Palestine Liberation
Organization by the first Palestine National Council in 1964 enabled China to bring
its support for the Palestinians out into the open.”).
98 Id. at 25.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 26.
92
93
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Shukaieiri, the first chairman of the PLO, to continue armed struggle
and “fight on unflinchingly to final victory.”101 As a general matter,
however, it appears that Chinese support for the Palestinians was
marked by occasional meetings between officials from the two
governments and did not extend to directing the day-to-day
activities of their Palestinian counterparts.102
Since the 1970s, however, the revolutionary fervor that once
characterized China’s early support for the Palestinians has
dissipated.103 For example, it appears China did not support any
factions during the Lebanese civil war that began in 1975—including
Palestinian ones—when years before any conflict involving
Palestinian groups would have prompted a firm response from the
Chinese.104 Moreover, China has evinced a preference for the more
moderate Palestinian factions, such as Fatah, while also publicly
calling on them to renounce the use of violence and to stop
committing acts of international terrorism 105 —in stark contrast to
China’s earlier funneling of weapons to the Palestinians and calls for
armed struggle in the region. Indeed, China deleted the term
“armed” in front of “struggle” in its 1974 and 1976 statements on
Palestine to the United Nations.106
Particularly in the past twenty years, China has been less vocal
in its support for the Palestinians, preferring instead to continue to
publicly champion itself as a supporter of the developing world and
emphasize diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.107 At
Id. at 27.
Harris, supra note 4, at 125.
103 See Sam Chester, How Syria, Israel, the Palestinians, and Egypt View China’s
Growing Role in the Middle East, GEO. SECURITY STUD. REV. 47, 55-56 (2015) (“During
the Cold War, Palestinian leaders could hardly have been more satisfied with
China . . . In the last two decades, however, China’s attitude to the Palestinians has
noticeably cooled.”).
104
Harris, supra note 4, at 152-53.
105 See PAUL J. SMITH, THE TERRORISM AHEAD: CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL
VIOLENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 151 (2008) (noting an example in which
China described the murder of Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich as “unfortunate”
and a Chinese official telling the UN that China has “never been in favor of such
adventurist acts of terrorism.”); Chris Zambelis, China’s Palestine Policy, JAMESTOWN
(Mar. 4, 2009), https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-palestine-policy/
[https://perma.cc/7RT4-KSZB] (stating that China supports the principles
outlined in the various peace initiatives in Israeli-Palestinian issue).
106
Harris, supra note 4, at 153.
107
Zambelis, supra note 105; see also Mohammed al-Sudairi, China’s Stance on
East Jerusalem, MERIP (Jan. 28, 2016), https://merip.org/2016/01/chinas-stance101
102
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the United Nations, China consistently votes in favor of resolutions
supporting Palestinian self-determination and condemning Israeli
uses of force against the Palestinians and the Israeli settlement
enterprise.108 However, much of its diplomacy in the region, at least
as it relates to Palestine, is set in the broader context of the so-called
Middle East “peace process,” as China appears to have signed onto
the international consensus. For example, it has expressed support
for the 1991 Madrid Conference, the Oslo Accords, the 2002 Road
Map, and the 2007 Annapolis Conference. 109 At the same time,
China has also been fostering closer political, military, and economic
ties with Israel. For example, when Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu visited China in 2017, the two countries signed ten
bilateral agreements with a value of more than $25 billion.110 China
has also been investing in infrastructure projects in Israel as well as
the country’s high technology, agriculture, food, water, and biotech
sectors.111 On the political-military front, however, relations remain
cool: arms sales between the two countries have been limited as a
result of pressure from the United States.112 However, since 2011, a
number of high-level Israeli military delegations have visited China,
including defense minister Ehud Barak in 2011, who discussed

on-east-jerusalem/ [https://perma.cc/UL3S-NECU] (observing that China’s
“revolutionary Maoist solidarity was gradually shelved in favor of a discourse of
peaceful resolution of the [Israeli-Palestinian] conflict that would accommodate
some Israeli demands.”); see also Charlotte Gao, China Takes Bigger Role in PalestineIsrael Issue as UN Rejects Trump’s Jerusalem Move, DIPLOMAT (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/china-takes-bigger-role-in-palestine-israelissue-as-un-rejects-trumps-jerusalem-move/
[https://perma.cc/P5ZX-4XD3]
(stating that China may be starting to take on a larger role in the Middle East “Peace
Process” as the Trump Administration begins to drop any pretense of being a
neutral peace broker).
108 See, e.g., Illegality of Israeli Settlements in Palestinian Territory Occupied
Since 1967, Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016); Protection of the Palestinian
Civilian Population, UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/20 (June 13, 2018);
The Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination, UN General Assembly
Resolution 73/158 (Dec. 17, 2018); Ensuring Accountability and Justice for All
Violations of International Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including
East Jerusalem, UN Human Rights Council Resolution 31/35, A/HRC/29/52 (Mar.
24, 2016).
109
Zambelis, supra note 105.
110
Elliott Abrams, What’s Behind Israel’s Growing Ties with China?, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 21, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/whatsbehind-israels-growing-ties-china [https://perma.cc/KYH5-CSJ9].
111 Id.
112 Id.
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issues such as Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and
counterterrorism.113
4.

CHINA AND THE UYGHURS: A FRAUGHT RELATIONSHIP

Xinjiang is an autonomous region114 in northwest China that is
home to approximately 20 million people from thirteen major ethnic
groups. 115 The largest of these is the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim
minority who comprise about 8 million of the region’s 20 million
people.116 Xinjiang first became a part of China around the 1750s,
though it was not at first colonized or otherwise settled, but rather
maintained as a strategic border area guarded by thousands of
Manchu and Chinese troops.117 As a region, Xinjiang experienced
sporadic bouts of autonomy, beginning with the collapse of the Qing
Dynasty in the early 20th century until it was fully incorporated into
the People’s Republic of China in 1949.118 For its part, China claims
that Xinjiang “has been an inseparable part of the unitary multiethnic Chinese nation” since at least 206 B.C.119
A region little-known to outsiders, Xinjiang, in recent years, has
made world headlines as bouts of ethnic violence have rocked the
region. The most noteworthy occurred in in 2009, when Uyghur
rioters took to the streets of Urumqi, the region’s capital, and in 2014,
113
Hiddai Segev, Sino-Israeli Security Relations: In America’s Shadow, MIDDLE E.
INST. (May 15, 2018), https://www.mei.edu/publications/sino-israeli-securityrelations-americas-shadow [https://perma.cc/4YT5-WSKJ].
114
For more on China’s system of regional national autonomy as it relates to
Xinjiang, see Matthew Moneyhon, Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s “New
Frontier”, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 120, 135-144 (2002).
115
Preeti Bhattacharji, Uighurs and China’s Xinjiang Region, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 29, 2012), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/uighursand-chinas-xinjiang-region [https://perma.cc/R95G-YY5E].
China officially
recognizes 56 ethnic groups, though there are a number of ethnic groups in China
that are “unrecognized.” For more on China’s ethnic minority policy and its ethnic
classification system, see generally THOMAS S. MULLANEY, COMING TO TERMS WITH
THE NATION: ETHNIC CLASSIFICATION IN MODERN CHINA (2011).
116
Bhattacharji, supra note 115.
117
Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang,
China,
ASIA-PAC.
CTR.
FOR
SEC.
STUDIES
(Jan.
2008),
https://apcss.org/college/publications/uyghur-muslim-ethnic-separatism-inxinjiang-china/ [https://perma.cc/9F55-8XSE].
118
Bhattacharji, supra note 115.
119 FOREWORD,
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/foreword.htm
[https://perma.cc/6SW5-GNWZ].
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when Uyghur assailants killed at least 29 people in a mass stabbing
attack in Yunnan province.120 These incidents were, however, the
symptoms of much more deeply-rooted social and economic
grievances on the part of the Uyghur minority that began as early as
the 1950s. It was during the Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957 and the
Cultural Revolution that the Uyghurs first experienced the
suppression of their religion at the hands of the state when their
religious texts and mosques were destroyed.121 While China began
to relax its policies toward ethnic minorities between the 1970s and
1990s, 122 China’s recent drive to develop Xinjiang has increased
economic disparities between the Uyghurs and recent Han
immigrants, leading to greater unrest and a concomitant crackdown
on Uyghur religious life.
The drive to develop Xinjiang began in 1999 as part of the Great
Leap West (xibu da kaifa) initiative.123 Although Xinjiang was rich in
natural resources, throughout the 1960s and 1970s Xinjiang’s
economy lagged behind that of the rest of China’s provinces as a
result of isolationist policies designed to counter Soviet influence
and respond to domestic opposition to the central government’s
policies.124 Despite the initiation of drastic economic reforms in 1992
heralded by Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Shenzhen, the benefits of
development were spread unevenly in favor of China’s eastern
provinces, and Xinjiang continued to be financially dependent on
the central government.125 In 1999, however—cognizant of the role
ethnic division had played in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia and responding to increased separatist violence in
Xinjiang 126 —President Jiang Zemin announced a one hundred
billion renminbi (RMB) project to transform the demographic
makeup of and invest in the infrastructure of the country’s western
regions, with Xinjiang as the initiative’s main focus. 127 Over the
120 China Mass Stabbing: Deadly Knife Attack in Kunming, BBC NEWS (Mar. 2,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26402367
[https://perma.cc/M8ND-AP8M].
121
Van Wie Davis, supra note 117.
122
Id.
123
Amy H. Liu & Kevin Peters, The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic
Effects of the Great Leap West, 17 STUD. ETHNICITY & NATIONALISM 265, 266 (2017).
124
June Teufel Dreyer, Ethnicity and Economic Development in Xinjiang, 2 INNER
ASIA 137, 140 (2000).
125 Id. at 151.
126
Liu & Peters, supra note 123, at 266.
127 Id. at 267.
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years, this project has been facilitated by a massive influx of Han
migrants 128 who, although initially concentrated in Urumqi, the
capital of Xinjiang, have spread throughout the region and into
traditional centers of Uyghur life.129 While Uyghurs accounted for
over 75% of Xinjiang’s population in 1949, and Han Chinese only
7%, as of 2009 Uyghurs represented only 46% of the population,
whereas Hans accounted for at least 40% of the population.130
The large in-migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang has generated
a variety of social problems and fueled rising income inequality
between the Han and Uyghurs. For example, the NGO Human
Rights in China reported that Han migration had “reduced human
access to clean water and fertile soil for drinking, irrigation and
agriculture.” 131 Moreover, on average, the monthly income for
Uyghur residents of Urumqi was 892 RMB in 2011, compared to
1,141 RMB for Han Chinese. 132 Ironically, the very economic
development that China believed would be instrumental in
promoting ethnic harmony and undermining secessionism in
Xinjiang133 appears to have had the opposite effect: apart from rising
income inequality, experts say that Uyghurs are the frequent victims
of employment discrimination, and many feel that the changing
demographic balance between Han Chinese and Uyghurs is diluting
128
Id. at 269 (“The tremendous demographic shift is not an unintended
consequence of the Great Leap West campaign. Instead, it appears to be a
fundamental policy that ties into China’s manifest destiny.”). See also Anthony
Howell & C. Cindy Fan, Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Han and
Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi, 52 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 119, 119 (2011)
(noting that while Han migration to Xinjiang from the 1950s to the 1970s was
“primarily state-orchestrated, recent Han migrants tend to be self-initiated”);
Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Apr.
11,
2005),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/04/11/devastatingblows/religious-repression-uighurs-xinjiang [https://perma.cc/ZA4X-HJME] (“The
transfer of ethnic Chinese labor was and is still seen widely in Chinese policy
making circles as aiding political integration and ultimately removing reasons for
political unrest.”) [hereinafter Devastating Blows].
129
GRAHAM E. FULLER & S. FREDERICK STARR, THE XINJIANG PROBLEM 16 (2003).
130
Liu & Peters, supra note 123, at 269.
131
Preeti Bhattacharji, Why China’s Xinjiang Spiraled Out of Control, NBC NEWS
(July 7, 2009), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31780068/displaymode/1098
[https://perma.cc/W893-TUZZ].
132
Liu & Peters, supra note 123, at 270.
133 See Van Wie Davis, supra note 117 (noting that “[t]he underlying idea is that
if the western regions, most notably Xinjiang, have sufficient development, then the
minorities will prosper, be less restive, give less support for separatist activities,
and be more integrated into the fortunes—both economic and political—of
China.”).
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their culture. 134 Much of this repression has been state-directed.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, for example, state authorities embarked
on a concerted effort to discourage religious observance by
surveilling mosques and harassing Uyghurs they perceived as too
religious.135 These policies were part of a broader “securitization”
campaign by state authorities that, among other things, called for
“severe” control of mosques, the banning of radio stations and
confiscation of unauthorized literature, the installation of security
cameras to surveil residents and houses, and profiling based on
levels of religious observance. 136 Simultaneously, China also
embarked on a diplomatic campaign to pressure neighboring
countries to limit Uyghur separatist activities within their borders.137
As noted previously, economic disparities and increased state
repression have only continued to fuel ethnic unrest in Xinjiang and
led to violent clashes between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. This has
led to a downward spiral in which ethnic violence has been met with
increased security measures, which has only fueled Uyghur
resentment toward the Han Chinese and the central government.
Although one might expect Muslim-majority countries in the
Middle East to harshly rebuke the most recent manifestation of
China’s “Strike Hard Campaign,” they have, in fact, remained
largely silent.138 For most China observers, this lack of a response is
not surprising. As Professor Michael Clarke observes:
In the context of the wider Islamic world, . . . the Uyghur
issue has had only moderate resonance. Many Islamic states,
particularly in the Middle East, have for the majority of the
134
Michael Martina, In China’s Xinjiang, economic divide seen fuelling ethnic
unrest, REUTERS (May 6, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinaxinjiang-insight/in-chinas-xinjiang-economic-divide-seen-fuelling-ethnic-unrestidUSBREA450X520140506 [https://perma.cc/456R-LNHF].
135
Devastating Blows, supra note 128.
136
Pablo Rodriguez-Merino, China’s Protracted Securitization of Xinjiang:
Origins of a Surveillance State, E-INT’L REL. (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.eir.info/2018/08/15/chinas-protracted-securitization-of-xinjiang-origins-of-asurveillance-state/ [https://perma.cc/LN3G-WWCT].
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., Nithin Coca, Islamic Leaders Have Nothing to Say About China’s
Internment Camps for Muslims, FOREIGN POLICY (July 24, 2018),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/24/islamic-leaders-have-nothing-to-sayabout-chinas-internment-camps-for-muslims/
[https://perma.cc/FB5J-4CQK];
Muslim Governments Silent as China Cracks Down on Uighurs, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/muslimgovernments-stay-silent-as-china-cracks-down-on-uighurs
[https://perma.cc/9WTP-G6N7].
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past decade perceived China to be not only a major source of
investment and a reliable customer for oil and gas but also a
potential foil for U.S. dominance in the region.139
Another reason for Middle Eastern countries’ trepidation with
confronting China about the Uyghur issue is that, unlike an issue
like Palestine, which is connected to one of the holiest cities in Islam,
“China has little place in the cultural imagination of Islam”.140 The
tepid response of Middle Eastern countries to China’s policy toward
the Uyghurs has been due in part to China’s ability to “isolat[e]
government-to-government relations from the Uyghur issue.”141 At
first, China accomplished this in the 1990s by committing its
regional neighbors to pursue a “zero tolerance approach” to Uyghur
separatism. 142 Subsequently, after the September 11th terrorist
attacks ushered in the so-called Global War on Terror, China framed
its Uyghur policy as a matter of protecting Xinjiang from Islamic
terrorism, and in a way both normalized (and internationalized) its
handling of the Uyghur issue. 143 China has also successfully
deprived the world of access to Xinjiang and the Uyghurs of access
to the wider world. For example, it restricts Uyghur’s freedom of
movement, punishes them for contacting families living abroad, and
interrogates and imprisons those with foreign ties.144 At the same
time, it has also been successful—at least until recently—in
deflecting media attention away from and controlling media access
to the region. As one observer notes, in contrast to the faces of
persecuted Rohingyas and images of clashes in Palestine, “few
images are emerging from Xinjiang due to restrictions on press
access and the massive state censorship apparatus. That means the
world sees little more than blurry satellite footage of the internment
camps.”145
139
Michael Clarke, China and the Uyghurs: The “Palestinization” of Xinjiang?,
MIDDLE E. POL’Y COUNCIL, https://mepc.org/china-and-uyghurs-palestinizationxinjiang [https://perma.cc/6UC8-CKFV].
140
Coca, supra note 138.
141
Clarke, supra note 139.
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BEIJING’S BALANCING ACT

How and to what extent does the Uyghur issue fit into China’s
policy toward Palestine? As some observers have noted, there
appears to be an inherent tension in China’s support for an
independent (presumably Muslim-majority) Palestinian state while
at the same time trying to contain the Uyghurs’ national aspirations
at home. Aron Shai, for example, writes that “if China persists in
criticizing Israel and continues to advocate a strict right to selfdetermination for Palestinians and Israeli Arab [sic], it could well
boomerang back and affect her delicate situation in Xinjiang and
Tibet (another problematic province as far as Beijing is
concerned.”146 Similarly, Matthew Moneyhon observes that “[i]n its
dealings with Xinjiang, the party walks a fine line between
encouraging a safe amount of autonomy (thereby placating and
neutralizing independence-minded Uighurs) and breeding local
nationalism or even more dangerous, ‘splittism’—the drive for
separation from the national body politic.”147 Why does Beijing feel
the apparent need to temper its support for an independent
Palestine with an eye toward its problems with the Uyghurs at
home? As Graham Fuller and S. Frederick Starr cogently note:
Nations tend to endorse the struggle of those peoples with
whom their own interests are linked—or, as often as not, as
an instrument against opponents. Governments readily
apply double standards depending on how such standards
affect friend and foe and how they relate to their perceptions
of their own national interests at the moment.
...
The fact that the Uyghur are also Muslim adds a special
intensity to the issue because of the high degree of
interconnectedness that exists among the world-wide
Muslim community—the umma. The very existence of an
umma . . . creates special bonds of awareness and sympathy
as Muslim minorities increasingly discover other Muslims in
similar predicaments.148
146
Aron Shai, China, Israel, the PLO and the Second Intifada, in CHINA &
ANTITERRORISM 158, 158 (Simon Shen ed., 2007).
147
Moneyhon, supra note 114, at 145.
148
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Indeed, in stark contrast to China’s ability to securitize the issue
in its bilateral relations with its neighbors and largely avoid any
meaningful criticism of its treatment of Uyghurs at the government
level, 149 major voices outside of official government institutions
continue to voice criticism of China’s policies in Xinjiang.
Contradicting the official Indonesian government line on Xinjiang,
for example, the Indonesian Chinese Muslim Association (PITI) and
Muslim-based Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) harshly rebuked
China for its brutal treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.150 Similarly, a
leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt suggested that Egypt’s
unwillingness to rebuke China over its treatment of Uyghurs was
borne out of a desire to avoid criticism of its own policy of silencing
dissent at home.151
Although there is a logical tension in China’s support for an
independent Palestinian state and its efforts to suppress calls for
independence in Xinjiang, I argue that these policies are not
contradictory and that China has managed to balance the two
remarkably well in its post-Cold War era international diplomacy.
As an initial matter, while not entirely consistent on this front, China
has hewed closely to the distinction drawn by international legal
jurisprudence and international legal instruments between selfdetermination in the context of military occupation and
decolonization on one hand, and secession on the other. In
supporting an independent Palestinian state, China has expressed
its view that Palestinian self-determination falls into the former
camp, while calls for an independent “East Turkestan,” by contrast,
belong to the latter. As a historical matter, China’s support for
Palestinian independence was a natural outgrowth of its efforts to
export Chinese socialist revolution abroad and counter American
imperialism and Soviet influence. Thus, while Palestine then as now
did not offer China much in the way of material benefits, it served
as an ideal export market for its model of Chinese socialist
revolution and an opportunity to gain a foothold of influence in the
Middle East when China was only beginning to assert itself on the
international stage.
Today, while China no longer actively supports revolutionary
movements abroad to the extent that it once did, its support for
Palestine continues to retain a similar, though purely symbolic value
149
150
151

Turkey and Iran are two notable exceptions. See Clarke, supra note 139.
Id.
Id.
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for China. While the need to brand itself as a revolutionary state and
to counter—as a defensive matter—Soviet influence and U.S.
imperialism in the region has dissipated, China is now eager to
proactively extend its influence westward throughout Asia and the
Middle East and to counter U.S. hegemony in Asia. 152 By
demonstrating China’s sympathy and support for a people and a
cause that Middle Eastern countries are similarly sympathetic
towards, China’s support for Palestine enables it to make further
inroads into the region. However, a belief that China’s Palestine
policy figures prominently into these countries’ calculus regarding
their relations with Beijing would be misplaced. As an initial matter,
while some have argued that China’s support for Palestinian
independence is intended also to deflect criticism away from its
treatment of Uyghurs,153 the value China derives from its Palestine
policy vis-à-vis the “Uyghur issue” is, in my opinion, questionable:
in its public statements and actions, China has largely refrained
from—at least explicitly—linking the issues of Palestine and the
Uyghurs together, and likely for good reason. China’s regional
neighbors are keenly aware of China’s actions in Xinjiang, 154 but
both lack the means and the desire to criticize China on this issue in
light of their own security and economic interests. 155 Moreover,
152 See Thomas P. Cavanna, What Does China’s Belt and Road Initiative Mean for
US
Grand
Strategy,
THE
DIPLOMAT
(June
5,
2018),
https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/what-does-chinas-belt-and-road-initiativemean-for-us-grand-strategy/ [https://perma.cc/ET65-MH8W] (commenting that
“[t]he BRI [Belt and Road Initiative] aims to stabilize China’s western peripheries,
rekindle its economy, propel non-Western international economic institutions, gain
influence in other countries, and diversify trade suppliers/routes while
circumventing the U.S. pivot to Asia . . . . Yet over time the BRI could threaten the
very foundations of Washington’s post-WWII hegemony.”).
153 See, e.g., Nima Khorrami Assl, Palestine UN Bid: Where does China stand?, AL
JAZEERA
(Sept.
29,
2011),
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
opinion/2011/09/2011928163950390354.html [https://perma.cc/7Y4V-2U4G].
154 Clarke, supra note 139 (noting that “China’s image among the publics of
these [Central Asian] states . . . is tarnished by the perceived ill-treatment of the
Uyghurs in Xinjiang and fears regarding Beijing’s influence in Central Asia” and
that many Central Asian experts on China are highly critical of China’s policies
toward the Uyghurs).
155 See Gene A. Bunin, Central Asia Struggles with Fallout from China’s Internment
POLICY
(Aug.
15,
2018),
of
Minorities,
FOREIGN
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/15/central-asia-struggles-with-fallout-fromchinas-internment-of-minorities/ [https://perma.cc/PD7X-ENLX] (“Though
people in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan all demand the reunification of
their families and the safety of relatives in Xinjiang, their governments, despite not
openly supporting China’s internal policies, still find themselves numb before an
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China has been able to successfully securitize the Uyghur issue in its
bilateral relations with regional neighbors and convince them to
“accede to its conception of the Uyghurs as ‘terrorists, extremists
and separatists’”.156
Additionally, one need only look to the massive loans and
financial aid that Chinese President Xi Jinping has pledged to
Middle Eastern countries as part of the so-called “Belt and Road
Initiative” to understand that the projection of China’s influence
westward is primarily a consequence of its military and economic
power, rather than simply China’s policy toward a single country.157
Another reason to doubt that China’s Palestine policy factors
significantly into Middle Eastern countries’ calculus regarding their
relationships with Beijing is that, on the whole, these countries
themselves have largely refrained from playing an active role in
helping to secure better treatment for Palestinians and an
independent Palestinian state. 158 However, through minimal
material and somewhat more rhetorical support for the Palestinians,
China has managed to facilitate—or at least eliminate one possible
roadblock to—the creation of a greater role for itself in the Middle
East, while at the same time not abandoning the Palestinian cause
outright emboldening secessionist movements at home.
The question is, of course, whether in China’s calculation of its
strategic interests, Palestine will continue to play a positive or at
least neutral role in its foreign policy, or whether its continued
support for Palestinian independence represents a liability that
could worsen its secessionist troubles at home. Though dissimilar,
the case of North Korea and China’s continued support for the
regime in Pyongyang suggests that China probably will not
abandon Palestine anytime soon—at least in its public words and
diplomacy. Ultimately, this careful balancing act will continue to
be facilitated by a lack of reproach from foreign governments about
China’s treatment of Uyghurs, as well as the careful distinction that
China—and international law—has drawn between permissible
overwhelmingly powerful neighbor. The numbness is understandable — too much
of these countries’ future development depends on China.”).
156
Clarke, supra note 139.
157
Maya Margit, China Entices Arab States with ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative, THE
MEDIA LINE (July 12, 2018), http://www.themedialine.org/biztec/china-enticesarab-states-with-its-belt-and-road-initiative/ [https://perma.cc/UZ5F-5RFR].
158 See, e.g., Noga Tarnopolsky, Palestinians look to Arab governments for support,
TIMES
(May
25,
2018),
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https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-gaza-arab-react-20180525story.html [https://perma.cc/7MSK-JJ36].
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claims of self-determination in the colonial and occupation context
and generally disfavored secessionist claims.
6.

CONCLUSION

Both historically and to the present day, Palestine has occupied
an important symbolic position in China’s foreign policy. Over the
years, as China’s interests have evolved and its geopolitical
influence increased, so too have the fundamental characteristics of
its policy towards Palestine. While in the 1950s and 1960s China
provided moral and material support to Palestine as part of a
broader strategy of exporting Chinese socialism abroad, China’s
contemporary Palestine policy has largely been subsumed under the
mantle of a broader strategy of securing an economic and strategic
foothold in the Middle East. In this context, in which the success of
China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” has rested primarily on securing
lucrative economic and trade deals with Middle Eastern countries
that have themselves largely eschewed responsibility for and
expressed a lack of interest in securing peace between the Israelis
and the Palestinians, China has been able to confine its support for
Palestine to expressions of support for the so-called Middle East
“peace process” and corresponding actions at the United Nations.
Although many scholars have noted the apparent tension in
China’s support for Palestinian self-determination and its efforts to
quash Uyghur secessionist elements in Xinjiang, it is unclear
whether this apparent tension has figured into the calculus of
Chinese policymakers responsible for policy toward Xinjiang and
Palestine respectively. To the extent that it has, I argue that it has
only done so minimally. Palestine offers little to nothing to China in
terms of its interests in the Middle East—especially given other
Middle Eastern countries’ lack of interest in the Palestine issue—and
China has generally been successful in “securitizing” the issue of
Xinjiang in its relations with its regional neighbors and
characterizing its Xinjiang policy as a matter of internal affairs.
Moreover, China at least outwardly benefits from the failure of the
international community to draw parallels between Xinjiang and
Palestine—though this has not prevented human rights groups from
doing so. In the context of international law, however, the
seemingly uneasy coexistence of China’s Palestine and Xinjiang
policies fits comfortably into the distinction drawn between
permissible claims of self-determination in the context of
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decolonization on one hand, and impermissible secessionist claims
on the other.
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